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It is generally agreed that scientific research yields its richest
rewards to those investigators who take the pains, in advance of
actual experiment, to review carefully the question to which they
propose to address themselves and to phrase their queries in a strict
and meaningful way. To random questions nature returns random
answers; only when we know dearly and rationally what we are
asking, have we placed ourselves in a field wherein an unambiguous
and final answer is possible. For this reason the preliminary con-
struction of a very careful hypothesis becomes of high importance
in scientific research.
But there is a corollary to the above remarks which in practice
is frequently disregarded, although mere lip-service is paid to it
on all sides. This corollary is the matter of rigorous terminology,
in the absence ofwhich it becomes impossible to construct hypotheses
carefully and accurately; and the use of a rgorous .termnology in
turn presupposes the employment of rigorous definition.
If Smith and Jones use the same label for different concepts,
the cooperation essential to successful scientific work is lost, not
deliberately but by default. And if the label a sometimes means
the concept A, sometimes the concept B, the sane result ensues.
Rigorous terminology is not an academic luxury; it is a bed-rock
necessity ofscientific success.
If put in sufficiently general ways we shall find little objection
to the above ideas. But when we become specfic, we meet a dif-
ferent situation. And specifically, in the Whole field of psychology
and to a lesser but increasing extent in the biological fields, we find
a prevalent misuse and misapplication of the basic term, normal.
That resulits in loose condusions; loose condusions bring the accept-
ance of half-truths and of self-defeating misinterpretations. It
seems evident that no science can survive indefintely under this sort
of concealed attack.
The lmisuse of the term, normal, in a sense synonymous with
"Caverage"l or"ordinary" is a case in point, for no such identity exists.
The average may be, and very often is, abnormal. The normal,
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on the other hand, is objectively, and properly, to be defined as that
which functions in accordance with its design. Design and function
are inseparably correlated in nature-even when one or the other
factor happens to be unknown to us-and the term, normal, was
originallyinvented and employed in recognition of that relationship.
The medical profession remains in general unconfused about
the distinction. For its specialized purposes it still considers the
term, abnormal, to be roughly synonymous with unhealthy or
diseased. It believes cancer, for example, to be a disease and those
Who suffer from cancer to be in an abnormal organic condition.
And it would continue to hold these beliefs, even if the population
of the entire planet should succumb to cancer. Averages, from the
medical point of view, do not define the normal state of health; it
is the absence of malfunction which does so.
In just the same way-and in any field dealing with human
beings-those men must be estimated as normal or abnormal who
are so in terms of the organism to which the adjective applies, i.e.,
in terms of the human organism. A million cripples do not, by
their mere numnber, acquire soundness nor does the presence of a
majority of lunatics in a given population make insanity norrnal, as
any director of a lunatic asylum will testify.
We can find this view occasionally stated by others. "There is
a definite standard of normality inherent in the structure and effec-
tive functioning of each species of organism. . . Human beings are
to be considered normal if they possess the full number of .
capacities natural to the human race, and if these ... are so balanced
and inter-related that they function together effectively and har-
moniously ... Normality, as we think, has nothing whatsoever to
do with the . . . average of a group or race of human beings, nor is
abnormality related to variations of different individuals from this
average ... At present the idea of abnormality seems to be hope-
lessly confused with the entirely different idea of a departure from
the average; what is average is supposed to be normal and what is
not average is supposed to be abnormal, although cobjectively it is
quite possible that the average may be the most abnormal of all
and any departure therefrom, ipso facto, in the direction of the
normal."*
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To such views it is often objected that they are abstract and
theoretical, that what confronts us in practical fact is the necessity
of forming some specific concept of the normal from tihe tabulation
of actual averages. But surely this last assertion can be denied.
If certain workers have constructed what they believe to be a norm
by the laborious process oftabulatii;g averages, they are simply mis-
taken in their choice of words; when you take an average, you take
an average and there can seem to ibe little justification for calling it
something else. Even if the misuse is employed by a statistician,
reasoningifrom medians rather than averages, the situation remains
the same.
There is a way to deduce norms but it depends upon the exami-
nation of design rather tihan the tabulation of averages, based upon
no matter how numerous a population.
If, from a colleotion of damaged bombsights, broken and par-
tially destroyed in crashes and forced landings, the Germans have
been able to discover the pattern and principle of the workable
Norden instrument, then equally from a sufficient number of human
biological specimens, even though none of them be perfect, we can
come to valid conclusions, not only concerning the more or less
abnormal average, but also in regard to the indicated norm froim
which each speimen manifests a particular departure.
We know, for example, that myelinization is essential to func-
tion in some nerve tracts; we also know that in many human beings
myelinization within the frontal lobe, especially of the fronto-
thalamic tract, is either partially or wholly deficient. How do we
know this, since all we see are the deficient "many human beings"?
We know it first because we learn about myelinization, next because
we find it lacking in a given specimen, and finally because we explain
the abnormality or malfunction of that specimen by the absence of
myelinization. This may not be formal, mathema-tical logic of the
Boelean type (in fact, it certainly isn't) but it is the sort of opera-
tional logic which research scientists employ and by means of which
research progresses. Our explanation of the discrepancy shows it
to be a measure of the specimen's departure from the normal, it
does not at all show that the discrepancy is an evidence of the nature
of the normal.
If this type of inductive reasoning from the particular to the
general were really inadequate no manufacturer could ever find out
his competitor's formula from an analysis of the competitor's product
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nor would we salvage the wrecked equipment of our enemies in
order todiscover their latest means of attacking us.
But in psychological matters the procedure is too often turned
about. There are those who despair of discovering fundamental
human design through a direct consideration of the apposite data
and hope to come upon it more easily by observing a sufficiendy
numerous and otherwise "fair" sample of specimens. Can we not
see that any such plan is doomed to failure by its inherent contra-
dictions? That when we continue to add individual abnormalities,
they will not canoel each other out but merely present to us a cumu-
lative index of abnormality? And that falsely to call the cumula-
tion of abnormnality a "norm" is only to bewitch and to bewilder
ourselves unmercifully?
Let us investigate the epistemological objection to our position
a little more closely. Let us take a simple example. If we come
across a broken wheel, it is possible legitimately to infer, in general
to discover, not only the inherent function of the object but in addi-
tion what is wrong (abnormal) about it. This is possible because
in every phenomenon design is an inherent element (quite irrespec-
tive of any implication as to designer). In the wheel the essence of
design is circularity including the presence of an axis, whether or
not specifically evidenced by tihe presence of a hulb. The function
potentially associated with circularity in a discrete dbject is revolu-
tion. We need not go into the diverse uses to which this function
may be put, e.g., when the wheel is incorporated into a wagon, a
belt-onveyor, a watch, or other mechanisms; the simplest point is
that circularity of form and revolution of movement are associated
as the constitutional and functional aspects of the same thing.
The epistemological objection consists in asserting that we can
only recognize the function of the wheel because of past experience
with other wheels and thus that in the end it comes down to a
question ofaverages, afterall. But it isdifficult to understand how,
in such acase, we can recognize a broken wheel the first time we see
one. On the epistemological argument we should have to conclude
that we confront, not a broken wheel, but an entirely novel object
of unaccustomed design and unknown function. We are, in fact,
under no such disability, we conclude quite properly that the pre-
ponderantdesign shows us awheel and that the local departure from
design, also manifested, Which prevents the fulfillment of the
wheel's natural function, is to be accounted for by the circumstance
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that the wheel has been broken. In no other way can we reach such
concepts as that of "broken wheel"; mere experience, no matter how
often repeated, cannot supply us with recognition of "broken wheel"
the first time we see one.
Do we, then, never accomplish this feat? Are we always told,
do we never discover? The writer is of opinion that a good many
children, confronted originally by a broken wheel, have worked out
its character by themselves long before being told. However, we
need not rely upon opinion. It is obvious -that, on the basis of this
cobjection, the first wheel could never have been either recognized
or invented. We know, however, that it was.
The constitutional-functional complex is not, in truth, a matter
connected with averages or, primarily, with repetitive experience.
Let us turn now to the mathematical grounds for the misuse of
the term, normal. In that branch of mathematical computation
known as statistics there has grown up the custom of using the label,
norm, and the alternative adjective, normal, as referring to a quan-
tity or imeasurement which is representative or typical of a given
class of dlata. Now there is a way in which this use of the terms is
legitimate and there are also circumstances which sometimes render
such use altogether illegitimate; but unfortunately the statistician
fails to entertain the distinction and frequently he embraces the
illegitimate side of the procedure.
If the concept to which the term is related is such that it corre-
sponds to the standard pattern to which the dass of which it is a
menmber conforms, then the use of norm or of normal is justified.
But ifthe concept is merely such that it corresponds to a majority of
other casesbelonging to theclass (any ofwhich might as easily have
been taken as the one which was in fact taken), then we have no
assurance either that the one which was taken or that the others
Which might have been taken, do actually confonn to such standard
pattern. In the latter case the use of norm is unjustified. It is not
sufficient to re-define norm or normal as that which is typical of any
class of data; it must be added that this is true only where the class
of data under consideration has itself already been determined as
conforming to its own inherent design or standard. In other words
mathematical computation can never take the place of empirical
ascertainment and the assumption that by a faulty use of terms it
can be made to do so, lies at the (base of a sometimes fallacious
employment of statistical methods. What is in fact normal can
497YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
never be ascertained simply by the use of any mathematical tool,
because its essential dependence is upon qualitative considerations,
and mathematics deals with quantitative data.
Such is one of the origins of the mathematical misuse of normal
but there is another origin also, this time deriving from the theory
of prcbabilities. Probability, as employed mathematically, is only
a dignified way of writing "ignorance." It is when we have no
grounds at all upon which to base an assumption tthat we have
recourse to prdbabilities. And here the basic assumption is made
that thechances ofvarious occurrences (as to which chances we know
nothing) are equal. That assumption seems neither more nor less
rational than any other oif a vast number of assumptions that the
chances are in one or another way unequal. Empirically it is not
as rational, for it always turns out empirically that the chances never
are equal. The dassic example is the tossing of coins and never yet
has it been found that the result is first heads, then tails, and so on
indefinitely. The more you toss, the doser they add up to equal
occurrences; lbut they do so by runs and this, if it suggests anything,
seems to show, not that the chances are ever equal, buit that over
sufficient periods of time the chances are alternately unequal in
different senses. It is certainly no reason at all for the assumption
that a position at the bulging middle of a "normal" probability curve
is more normal than one at either of its tapering ends. It can only
be said that a middle posi'tion is more typical of the data under con-
sideration but it tells us nothing as to the normality or abnormality
of the data. If the data be abnormal-and this is a question inac-
cessible to any mathematical technic-then the more typical the
instance, thecloseritcorresponds to theparticular abnormality repre-
sented by the class of which it is a member.
In psychology the employment of statistical methods has
bloomed mightily in recent years and, in the main, this is an excel-
lent devellopment, for these methods can 'be powerful tools of
analysis when legitimately used. But the tendency to indulge in
their illegitimate use has seemed to be an easy substitute for the
harder task of empirical ascertainment and from that attitude has
arisen the fallacious and decep'tive misuse of norm and normal in
the psychologically mistaken sense of typical or average.
Now we come to another, equally strong argument for the
insistence upon the contrasted significance of t'he two terms, normal
and average, a significance originally clear in our vocabulary. The
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synonyms of "average" are everywhere listed as mean, medium,
generality, compromise; those -of "normal" as norm, design, pattern,
model, prototype, standard, paradigm. It seems hardly possible
for anyone to be confused regarding the contrast between the two
lists, and when we trace the derivation of the two terms, it seems
even less possible. "Normal" comes from the Latin norma, which
means a "rule" or "pattern" and was originally derived from the
name of a mason's tool, a square by means of which his work and
his designs were standardized. "Average" is derived from two
Latin words, the preposition, ad, and the noun, verum, the combi-
nation signifying "toward the truth" or "approaching the truth,"
thus an "approximation." Since it is evident that for anything to
approach the truth, there must be a prior truth or standard for it to
approach, the distinction and the proper use of the two terms are
plain.
It is also plain that the original justification for the coinage of
the two ikvbels was that they referred to two entirely different con-
cepts. This matter of terminology gains its importance from the
fact that terms denote concepts. And when we have identified
"normal" with "average" and also have failed to replace the label,
norm.al, with another term denoting its original significance, we have
dropped from our vocabulary-and from our thinking-a concept
vital to the understanding of many problems and certainly to that
both of psychological and biological problems.
The question as to the discovery or recognition of a given
standard or norm is an empirical problem, not a logical one, and
simply does not enter into the necessary terminological distinction.
On the other hand he would be a very strict empiricist who main-
tained that science could safely dispense with liogical considerations.
The empirical problem of the discovery of the normal in respect
to human beings is, of course, of the very highest importance, since
that discovery must furnish not only our standard of rational com-
parison but likewise our standard of evaluation of all psychological
research in any basic sense. Its importance, indeed, is so great that
not a few workers unconsciously manifest the false modesty of pro-
claiming its solution beyond their efforts or even their attempts. It
is premature to face thisproblem seriously, they say.
Asimple question, itwould seem, disposes of that position: when
will it Tbe time to do so? And since all our findings must be evalu-
ated eventually in terms of the answer to the problem of the essen-
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tially normal, it would appear that it is most of our present under-
takings which are actually premature, surely not the attempt to
discover the standard by which they must be judged.
But sometimes the reply is that we must await further advances
by biology. Or by physiology. Or by neurology. Or by some
other branch of science. However, it does not seem to be the
paucityof data which is to blame, it seems to be the refusal to corre-
late the availaible data in a psychological sense with the problem of
the human norm. The place to begin the attack is apparent, as is
also a superabundance of available datawhen compared to the efforts
made to utilize them.
A rigorous termin-ology is a required preliminary in approaching
the problem and we propose to use normal and average as distin-
guishable contrasts and to define them as follows:
"average"-that which results from mathematical computation based
upon more than one sample, i.e., a specimen mean,
"normal"-that which functions in accordance with its inherent design,
i.e., a pattern norm.
But none of this will alter the current misuse of the term, nor-
mal, nor will it suddenly disestalblish the long habits and associations
of its misemployment, now hardened into scientific and even popular
vocabulary. We therefore propose to embrace an alternative men-
tioned earlier and to replace the label, normal, with another term
denoting the original significance of normal. The term will be
"paradic,"-fromparadigm, one of the synonyms ofnormal. Paradic
will be employed as meaning solely: that which functions in accord-
ance with its inherent design.
So far this is mere definition-but now we must advance to a more
unorthodox position. For we intend to assert a direct, but largely
unremarked, implication of biology, viz., that the organic design of
the human being is the one complete design of its kind existing
within the entire organic kingdom on this planet. The detailed
arguments on whieh the statement rests are too lengthy for present
reproduction but it is felt that almost any 'biologist must agree with
them upon reflection. They are based not only upon structural
considerations but on functional ones as well; no other creature
behaviorally manifests the integration of intellectual, affective, and
sensorimotor response which characterizes man or, if any do, then
by no means to the same degree of completeness. Thus the human
500THE MEANING OF NORMAL 501
design represents the complete and fundamental organic pattern,
from which other species depart by one degree or another, and the
basic paradic of the organic kingdom is the anthroparadic.
It makes little difference whether we approach the question from
the side of structure or of function. It will not surprise us that that
organism which manifests the most complexly integrated activities in
its behavior should also possess the most highly complex and com-
plete integrating organ, viz., the central nervous system. On the
ground of highest coordination and of most diverse activities coordi-
naited, man is the standard against which all other organisms must
be measured, because objectively other organisms are either less
diverse orless coordinated in activity. The same is true of morpho-
logical design. On the basis ofcompleteness the anthroparadic must
be the ultimate paradic of the whole organic kingdom.
What, then, is the anthroparadic? At the end we confront this
fascinating and basic question, with the preliminary necessity of
rigorous definition, rigorous concept, and nrgorous terminology as
the first essential.